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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about the 17th day of March, 2009, at approximately 8:16 o'clock p.m., 
Idaho State Trooper Jayne observed a Subaru Station Wagon in the opposing lane of 
.................. ·········traffic,followedby a Ioyota pick-up truck with Montana Iicense plates. Jayne testified 
under oath in court that the reason he activated his lights was the lack of a front license 
plate on the Subaru (Tr., p.6, Ls. 6-23), however, the actual reason for the stop was that 
the Subaru had one headlight missing. (State's Exhibit 1, 19:16:50-19:16:57 and 
19:24:10-19:24:29). No citation was ever issued to the Subaru. The officer made a "U-
turn" and, catching up with the vehicles, followed them both for about a mile. Although 
Jayne stated that his intention was to stop only the Subaru, the vehicle directly in front of 
Jayne was the pick-up truck from Montana, and, when Jayne activated his lights, both 
vehicles,pulled into a graveled area along the side of the road. (State's Exhibit 1, 
19:18:00-19:18:20). Jayne testified that the truck came to a complete stop and after that 
it did not pull in behind the patrol vehicle. (Tr., p.17, L.2-3). 
Jayne testified that he was going to allow the truck to continue on its way, but 
then changed his mind because the vehicle did not leave on its own. (Tr. p. 8, L.3-9). 
However, as Judge Yerby related: "Within seconds the officer steps from the patrol 
vehicle, which still has its lights on, and then instead of going towards the forward car 
and motioning the stopped pickup truck to proceed on its way, instead turns and proceeds 
within again a matter of seconds ... from the time you hear the door click open to the time 
that the officer says hello to the driver of the pickup truck there's about 16 seconds that 
elapses." (Ir. p.36, L 3-23). Judge Yerby found that a reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave. 
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Jayne testified that he did not have any reason to suspect marijuana until he 
smelled the odor of fresh marijuana after the driver rolled down his window. (Tr., p.18, 
L.9-10, and p.19, L. 17). Jayne also testified that he did not initially recognize the 
..... vehicle.· However, upon reaching the vehicle, theofficerimmediately.showed .. that.he ... 
recognized the occupants and reminded Respondent of prior contacts. (State's Exhibit 
One at 19:18:50). When backup arrived, and Officer Jayne was discussing the matter 
with another officer, Jayne stated "Mr. Ray always has marijuana with him. I gness I 
stopped you once when you didn't have marijuana on you, right, Irving? So, I'm what, 
three for four or something like that? That's always his truck, he's always in it." (State's 
Exhibit One at 19:56:34 to 19:57:04). 
The District court found that Respondent submitted to the authority of the state 
patrolman, and that there was no probable cause or articulable suspicion justifying 
detention of the pick-up truck. (Tr., p.35, L.8-12.) The court further found that it would 
be "an unreasonable presumption" for the driver to feel free to leave. (Tr., p.35, L.25; 
Tr., p.36, L.21-23.) 
ISSUES 
The State does not fairly state the issue: 
The district court did not err in concluding that Ray was seized for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, where the 
officer activated his emergency lights in Ray's rear view mirror and Ray submitted 
to the lawful authority of the police by pulling over to the side of the road. 
A. Application of the correct legal principles to the facts ofthis case shows a seizure 
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for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and of Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, 
where the officer did not have probable cause or justification to detain the vehicle yet 
required the driver to pull over and to respond to questions . 
...... ..... ···R ········Theldaho Constitutionprovidesgreaterprotectionforits citizens than does the .... 
Constitution of the United States, and therefore the defendant does not have to prove bad 
faith on the part of the officer in order to obtain a remedy for the constitutional violation. 
C. Attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to 1. C. § 19-2801, Rule 54.18 of the 
Idaho Criminal Rules, and Rille 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure where appeal 
was brought by the State ofIdaho in order to contest a bright-line rule oflaw that is well 
established. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Application of the correct legal principles to the facts of this case 
shows a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and of Article 1, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, where the officer did not have probable cause or jnstification to 
detain the vehicle yet required the driver to pull over and to respond to questions. 
The police videotape shows Ray's Toyota truck pulling over to the curb in 
response to the emergency lights, and coming to a stop, while the police vehicle then 
pulled past it. The police vehicle stopped between both vehicles, with the overhead lights 
continuing to flash. (State's Exhibit One at 19: 18:04 to 19: 18:24). The State argued that 
the Toyota was not stopped because it pulled in behind the trooper's patrol car, and that 
therefore it was not seized. The State also argued that the act of pulling in behind the 
patrol car gave Jayne probable cause to address the driver out of fear for his safety. 
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(State's Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p.4, L.19). However, Jayne 
testified that the truck came to a complete stop and after that it did not pull in behind the 
patrol vehicle. (Tr., p.17, L.2-3) . 
. ... ............. ···Thepertinentstatuteregardingmotor vehicles on approach of a.law.enforcemenL. 
vehicle, reads as follows: 
49-625 OPERATION OF VEHICLES ON APPROACH OF 
AUTHORIZED EMERGENCY OR POLICE VEHICLES. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency 
or police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal, 
meeting the requirements of section 49-623, Idaho Code, the 
driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and 
immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as 
possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful for 
parking and clear of any intersection, and stop and remain in 
that position until the authorized emergency or police vehicle 
has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer. 
Idaho Code § 49-625(1). Therefore, no reasonable person would feel free to proceed on 
his way, and would be subject to criminal charges if he did so. Ray's vehicle was seized 
when the overhead police lights were turned on and when the driver submitted to the 
show of authority. 
In the case of State v. Willoughby, two patrol cars with overhead lights were 
determined to have detained the defendant who was stationed in a parking lot. The state 
argued that the statute requiring submission to overhead lights did not apply to a 
defendant who was not a driver ofa vehicle on a highway. State v. Willoughby, 147 
Idaho 482, _,211 P.3d 91,94-95 (2009). The Court in that case reasoned that the 
officers' actions were a show of authority and that a reasonable person would believe that 
the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her movement. "Willoughby's 
actions of remaining at the scene and stepping out of his car as Officer Gillmore 
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approached constituted submission to the officer's show of authority". Id. at 98. The 
officers in that case immediately noticed signs of intoxication, and the court in that case 
suppressed the evidence because it had been obtained in the course of an unlawful 
detention; Id.atlOO. Similarly in our case, Respondent submitted to .the.officer's.show ... 
of authority, when he pulled over to the side of the road, and rolled his window down to 
speak to the law enforcement officer who had pulled him over. Because the state did not 
have any reason to detain him, or any evidence of wrongdoing prior to the unlawful 
detention, any evidence or incriminating observation obtained thereafter should be 
suppressed as fruits of the unreasonable detention, search and seizure. 
The Court of Appeals ofIdaho determined that a passenger may challenge the 
detention ofa vehicle in which he is riding, in State v. Lun!!, 126 Idaho 235,880 P.2d 
265, (Id. App. 1994), a landmark case for suppression of evidence including statements 
obtained in the course of an unreasonable detention. In this case the state does not 
contest,that Respondent has standing to challenge the detention of the vehicle, both as a 
passenger thus wrongfully detained, and as the owner of the vehicle thus wrongfully 
searched. In State v. Luna, the occupants ofthe vehicle were lawfully detained in the 
course of a legitimate traffic stop, where the vehicle was traveling below the speed limit 
and crossing the centerline. However, the stop was impermissibly prolonged after the 
officers determined that the driver was not intoxicated, but continued interrogating the 
driver until given consent to search. Similarly, in our case, when the officer stepped out 
of his patrol car, he could have motioned Defendant's unlawfully detained vehicle to 
proceed on its way, but instead chose to keep the vehicle waiting until he approached to 
question and investigate the occupants, whom he recognized. 
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The State argues that Defendant should have known that he was not the subject of 
the stop, and that his vehicle was free to leave as soon as the flashing patrol car drove in 
front of the Toyota and stopped behind the Subaru. However, the ninth circuit case upon 
............ which the State relies is inapposite to the·matter··before .. thecourttoday.UnitedStates.v .... 
Al Nasser, 555 F.3rd 722 (9th Cir. 2009). In that case a vehicle chose to drive up and stop 
near to lights flashing on a border patrol investigation that was already underway. In 
denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence, the court held that a reasonable 
person would know that the flashing lights were not directed at them, and that the police 
action must be intentional in order for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated. Id., at 
727-32. ,In the instant case, law enforcement intentionally flashed emergency lights 
directly behind the vehicle he claims he did not want to stop. No reasonable driver would 
feel free to ignore the lawful authority of those lights. 
To hold, as the state suggests, that the driver of a motor vehicle is free to leave as 
soon as,ia patrol car with lights flashing has moved in front of said vehicle, would hamper 
the ability of law enforcement to maneuver around the scene of an investigation. The 
driver should not have to determine the officer's subjective intent, perhaps incorrectly, 
before deciding whether to submit to authority. In this case the driver reasonably 
believed he was being pulled over, and submitted obediently to the directive of law 
enforcement. He is entitled to his remedy. 
B. The Idaho Constitution provides greater protection for its citizens 
than does the Constitution of the United States, and therefore the defendant does 
not have to prove bad faith in order to obtain a remedy for the constitutional 
violation. 
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The State incorrectly paraphrases the court's findings where it states that Judge 
Verby"specifically found that the officer's actions were 'perfectly reasonable' under the 
circumstances". The State claims that the district court found that the officer's actions 
. ... .. . appearedperfectlyreasonable, However, the district court didnotmakea specific 
finding that the officer's actions were reasonable, for the purposes of search and seizure. 
That is, that the officer's detention of the vehicle was supported by articulable reasons 
justifying the stop. In fact, the court made the opposite finding as it suppressed the 
evidence. 
A reasonable seizure is one that is substantiated by articulable probable cause to 
believe that a crime is or has been committed. Jayne actually testified that he had no 
reason to stop this vehicle. In this case, the officer ignored a well-settled bright-line rule 
that instructs him not to detain or investigate travelers without articulable cause. 
Instances where an officer cannot avoid detaining a vehicle not the subject of any 
investigation, do not permit the officer to unreasonably prolong the stop so that he can 
chat with, and incidentally investigate, the driver when merely motioning the vehicle to 
move on is all that is necessary. 
The good faith exception, applied in some other jurisdictions, permits an 
exception to the exclusionary rule where an officer believes that he has a valid warrant, or 
is acting in accordance with an unlawful statute. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 at 992 
(Idaho 1992). This case does not fall within either of the exceptions, however, even ifit 
did, the Idaho court in Guzman explains clearly why it does not allow the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule in Idaho: " ... Evidence illegally seized must be 
suppressed because to admit it would constitute an independent constitutional violation 
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by the court ... " Id., supra at 992. 
The exclusionary rule originally only applied to federal courts where evidence 
was excluded to deter violations of the United States Constitution. See Mapp v. Ohio, 
.... ······367 U$, 643, 64681S.Ct. ·1684,1687 (1961). The Idaho SupremeCourtwas .ahead .. oL. 
its time when it first excluded evidence based upon violations of the Constitution of the 
State ofIdaho. State v. Arregui, 36 Idaho 396, 211 P. 440 (1927). The interests ofthe 
state in excluding wrongfully obtained evidence are manifold, including the integrity of 
the judicial system, the provision of a remedy for constitutional violations, and 
encouraging the warrant application process; State v. Guzman, supra at 993. The state 
would argue that it should not be sanctioned merely because " ... the constable has 
blundered ... ", however, if the Idaho Supreme Court were to reverse itself in this case, it 
is easily foreseeable that law enforcement will become adept at pulling over trains of 
vehicles under the guise of a single stop. 
It is not a valid argument against suppression to protest that "the guilty go free"; 
innocent parties who are wrongfully searched or seized have no remedy at all. If no 
evidence of criminal activity is discovered, there is nothing to be suppressed. The court 
does not know or hear anything of the thousands of vehicles that are detained without 
cause, subjected to questioning as a drug dog sniffs around the vehicle, and then are 
allowed to move on. The court only sees the exceptional cases, where A) the stop was 
not only unlawful, but also B) resulted in the seizure of evidence, and also, C) happened 
to target a defendant who had the means to obtain counsel to defend him, and fmally, D) 
who is willing to risk vindictive prosecution should suppression be denied. The court 
does not know the hundreds of defendants who plead guilty to crimes they did not 
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commit for lack of any meaningful altemative. 
It is an irony of our system that the most sacred of our laws, our constitutional 
freedoms, are often circumvented by law enforcement, and that the criminally accused is 
.... ·········theonlypartywithstandingtoprotecfusfrompolicemisconduct. ... 
C. Attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to I. C. § 19-2801, Rule 54.18 of 
the Idaho Criminal Rules, and Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure where 
appeal was brought by the State of Idaho in order to contest a bright-line rule of law 
that is well established. 
This appeal was brought by the State of Idaho in order to contest a bright-line rule 
oflaw that is well established and recently enforced in State v. Willoughby, where the 
Court held that the defendant was not free to leave when police cars activated their lights 
in an apartment parking lot. State v. Willoughby. 142 Idaho 482, 211 P.3d 91 (Idaho 
2009). ,The issue on appeal in Willoughby was whether the statute dictating vehicle 
response to emergency or police lights applied to a vehicle that was stationary in a 
parking lot. Id., supra. See also Idaho Code § 49-625(1). The Supreme Court's en bank 
decision held that the statute applies to all vehicles present at the scene, affirming the trial 
court, the district court and the Court of Appeals; the rulings were unanimous from the 
magistrate on up, all upholding the suppression of evidence in that case. Willoughby. 
supra. 
No such novel issue arises in this case. The officer testified that Defendant's 
vehicle was pulled over without probable cause, incidental to the investigation of another 
vehicle on the road. There is no material dispute to any substantive fact. There is no fine 
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question of law for the Court to debate, where the time spent could benefit the lower 
courts with guidance on future cases. In this case the prosecutor appealed the district 
court ruling merely because he could, at no cost to himself, and with very little effort, 
..forcethedefendanttogo to great expense defending.against.an.appeaL. The .. appeaLis.not ... 
grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or by any good faith argument for an 
alteration of existing law. 
For this reason, Defendant submits that the only novel issue that might be possible 
for the court to entertain in this case would be whether, under such egregious 
circumstances as these, any statutory authority exists permitting the Court to award 
attorneyJees to a criminal defendant as a sanction for abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has long held that it has no authority to award costs 
or attorney fees on appeal in a criminal case. State v. Callahan. 143 Idaho 856, 153 P.3d 
1202 (Id. App. 2006). State v. Roll 118 Idaho 936,801 P.2d 1287 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Respondent submits that statutory authority exists in I. C. § 19-2801 where an appeal 
may be taken, " ... within such times and in such manner as prescribed by Rule of the 
Supreme Court." Rule 54.18 of the Idaho Criminal Rules dictates that any appellate 
procedure not specified or covered by these rules shall be in accordance with the 
appropriate appellate rule or the appropriate criminal rule to the extent that they are not 
contrary to Rule 54, while Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules states that costs are 
awarded to the prevailing party as a matter of course, and Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules establishes the procedure for a party seeking attorney fees. Defendant further 
argues that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply when an issue is not addressed 
elsewhere, and that the sanctions contained in Rule II of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure must be applied to criminal cases as well. 
As stated earlier, the irony that a criminal is the only party with standing to 
enforce the liberty guarantees in our Idaho Constitution, is made more compelling by the 
.. consideration.that,.after. the.cas.e.is.won,.andsuppressionhas.been.granted,eYentlle ... 
brightest line oflaw must be decided again and again by our courts where the prosecution 
is unrestrained. This case exemplifies a case where sanctions in a criminal proceeding 
would best serve the interests of justice and of the expediency ofthe courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in concluding that Ray was seized for purposes of the 
Foruth Amendment. The officer did not merely activate his lights to stop another vehicle. 
The officer pulled two vehicles over when only one was reasonably intended to be 
detained. Instead of exiting his patrol vehicle and moving toward the intended target, 
while motioning the innocent driver ofthe second vehicle to move on, the officer was at 
the window of the nnlawfully detained vehicle within seconds ofthe stop, and ignored his 
purported target. No driver would have felt free to leave under current law. An alteration 
of current law would have serious consequences for officer safety and enforcement of 
I.C. § 49-625(1), where drivers would have to guess which vehicle is being stopped and 
which is free to leave. 
There is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Idaho, another bright 
line rule of law that has been clearly decided by the Idaho Court. The Constitution of the 
State ofIdaho provides greater protections to its citizens than are granted by the United 
States Constitution. 
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Where the defendant is forced to defend an appeal over issues that have long been 
decided, and there is no good argument for a change in the law justifying detention of 
citizens without any cause, the Court should award attorney fees to even a criminal 
. ...defendantonappeal. ... 
t.. 
DATED this d.'1 dayof I(\I\~ ,2010. 
Val Thornton, Attorney for DefendantlRespondant 
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